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In the current literature, there are mixed evidences regarding the automaticity 
of theory of mind. Three studies were conducted to further investigate the question of 
whether adults do automatically take into account others' mental states in 
understanding behavior, and under what circumstances would the deployment of 
theory of mind be enhanced. 
In study 1’ replication of Wertz and German's (2007) study on belief-desire 
reasoning was conducted to collect qualitative feedback on improving the 
experimental design. Study 2 and study 3 were extension of the original Wertz and • 
German's (2007) study. Through presenting different mixes of false belief and true 
belief stories to different groups of participants, study 2 provided evidence that 
people's performance on belief-desire reasoning would be affected by the 
predominant mental state that the environment called for in general, instead of what 
was particularly entailed in a single incident. Study 3 showed that highlighting 
contextual cues related to mental states, such as deception and initial desire, could 
reduce the error in making mental-states attribution for others' behaviour. The results 
ofthese studies are consistent with the argument that theory ofmind is strategic in 
nature and requires devotion of mental resources, but inconsistent with the Theory of 
Mind Mechanism model arguing for an automatic theory of mind mechanism. 
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Theory of mind refers to an understanding of mental states such as belief, 
desire, intention and knowledge, as well as the capacity to attribute these mental states 
to oneself and others. It enables us to perceive others as distinct entities, providing a 
way to explain and predict others' behavior through inferring their mental states 
(Astington, 2003). In order to attribute mental states to others and use them to make 
sense of behavior, people must be able to appreciate that others generate their own 
independent mental representations of the world using the information they have, and 
such representations may differ from one another and reality. This also means that one 
must be able to maintain different representations of the world simultaneously. It is a 
‘theory’ of mind in that such representations are not ‘directly observable'. (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978). 
Given that the human mind and its thinking are complicated, and a wide 
variety of information is relevant in understanding and predicting other's action, 
theory of mind entails understanding of various mental states. In particular, belief and 
desire are acknowledged to be the most important mental states for the explanation 
and prediction ofhuman action (Davidson, 1963; Wellman, 1991). People typically 
engage in actions because they believe those actions will satisfy their desires. On the 
other hand, we understand others' actions by inferring their beliefs and desires. For 
example, if one believes that an object is in a particular location and s/he desires the 
object, sy^e is likely to perform an action to retrieve the object from that location. In 
same vein, if we know that a person did a particular action like searching for an object 
in a specific location, we can infer the reasons that may have caused this action - s/he 
desires the object and believes that the object is in that location. Such inferences help 
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us organize and make sense of the actions performed by the people around us, thus 
facilitating social interaction. 
Theory of mind has long been viewed as a milestone in children's cognitive 
development. As a milestone, the developmental investigation of theory of mind is 
often framed as a question of presence or absence, such that people are interested in 
when and under what circumstances children demonstrate their capacity of 
understanding others' mental states. What happens beyond the development of such 
rudimentary theory of mind, however, has largely been overlooked. Few studies have 
been conducted to investigate how the mature theory of mind works in enabling our 
understanding and prediction of other people's behavior, or enhancing interaction in 
the social context. There has not been a comprehensive account on how adults deploy 
their theory of mind capacity in social interactions, and this clearly is a gap in the 
current literature that deserves more attention. Indeed, perspective taking, a 
component of theory of mind that enables us to consider the world in another 
individual's viewpoint (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008), has been shown to 
be pivotal in a variety of social and interpersonal exchanges, including social 
cooperation (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007), negotiation (Galinsky et al., 2008), poker game 
(Lopes, 1976), politics, and business (Findler, 1990; Axelrod, 1987). Given the role of 
theory of mind in social interaction, it would be beneficial to identify the processes 
involved such that ways of enhancing smoother social interaction could be found. 
As social beings, we readily utilize our theory of mind capability in everyday 
life, such that we can understand others' action and even predict what they are going 
to do next. This helps organize information from our surrounding in an ordered and . 
predictable way. With the frequent and seemingly effortless deployment of theory of 
mind in our personal experience, several theorists have argued that theory-of-mind 
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must be automatic (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Sperber & Wilson，2002), which 
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depends on domain-specific modular processes that are fast, spontaneous, 
encapsulated, with its functioning largely independent of intellectual general 
capacities of the individual. However, some recent research has provided evidence 
otherwise (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Keysar, Lin, & 
Barr, 2003)，suggesting that theory of mind might be strategic in nature, requiring the 
devotion of attention and cognitive effort. The present study aims at investigating 
theory of mind in adults, particularly at testing whether theory of mind reasoning is 
automatic. If not, what are the factors that trigger its deployment? We believe that 
understanding the cognitive mechanism involved in the performance of a mature 
theory of mind would not only contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
this important capability, but also shed light on how to improve people's social 
interaction through its effective deployment. 
Literature review 
The developing theory of mind 
Research on theory of mind has devoted a great deal of attention in 
pinpointing its developmental path. Successful performance on false belieftasks has 
long been viewed as a milestone in children's cognitive development, and much effort 
has been put into identifying the earliest age at which it is demonstrated in children. 
Owing to wide variation in linguistic and general cognitive ability of children in 
different age groups, vastly different methods have been devised to tap the 
understanding of mental states in different target age-groups, ranging from the 
habituation procedure in infants to story-based scenario studies in young children. 
1 
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Understanding of intention seems to come first in the developmental pathway. 
Using a habituation procedure, Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra and Biro (1995) found that 
12-month-old children were able to demonstrate an understanding that intentional 
agents act in rational ways. Li a study on 18 month olds' ability to understand the 
intentions of others, Meltzoff (1995) found that children mimic intentional, but not 
unintentional, behaviors of adults in their environment, and that they imitate 
considerably less often when a machine is performing the behavior. This experiment 
suggests that infants younger than two years of age may be considering the intentions 
of others and interpret humans, not machines, as intentional beings. 
As children grow up, they began to grasp the concept of desire and the link 
between desire and action. By age 3，children understand some aspects of the links 
between people's thinking or feeling and their behavior. In a study done by Lillard and 
Flavell (1992), it was demonstrated that children of age 3 knew that a person who 
wanted something would take action to get it, and also that a person might still want 
something even if s/he could not have it. Yet, they might not understand the basic 
principle that actions were based on one's own representation of reality, and that a 
person's representation may differ from the external reality. This was evidenced by 
the fact that children do not pass the false belief tests reliably until age 6. 
The understanding of belief, acknowledging that people could have beliefs that 
differ from the external reality or from others', is a significant milestone that marks 
the development of a mature theory of mind. By 6 years old, children could reliably 
pass false-belief tasks. They have a sophisticated theory of mind that enables them to 
distinguish between their own mental states and reality, and those of others, as well as • 
understand the actions of others in terms of their underlying mental states. 
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To summarize, before 2 years of age, infants have some rudimentary 
understanding of the mental state of intention, viewing people as volitional agents 
having distinct goals and intentions. From 2 to 3 years, they start to understand the 
mental state of desire, and its role in guiding people's action. From 4 years onwards, 
children begin to grasp the mental state of belief, understanding that different people 
might hold different representations of the world that may or may not concur with 
objective reality, such that they could reliably pass false belief and other theory of 
mind tasks. 
While the mainstream view is that children's performance on standard theory 
of mind tasks truly reflects their theory of mind capacity, there has been evidence 
suggesting that children's task performance may sometimes be significantly affected 
by extraneous or contextual factors. A number of researchers have claimed that the 
original false-belief tasks are unnecessarily difficult, confounding false belief 
understanding with other general cognitive demands, and that children's performance 
can be improved to above-chance level if the tasks are suitably revised (Cassidy, 1998; 
Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Sullivan & Winner，1993). For example, in Sullivan & 
Winner's (1993) study, when the false-belief task was framed in terms of trickery, 
children's attribution of false-belief and ignorance improved significantly such that 
young 3-years olds were able to pass the test. These results have indicated that 
children of 3 years old or younger can distinguish other's mental states from their own, 
and that false belief competence is expected to be high among young children if it is 
assessed correctly (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Fodor, 1992). 
Mechanism underlying theory of mind 
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The investigation into the developmental route of theory of mind leads to the 
formulation of models underlying this complex cognitive capability. The vast 
differences in the levels of theory-of-mind development have lent support to the view 
that the early capacity for mental state representation has an innate, automatic basis. 
Leslie, Friedman and German (2004) proposed a two-component model of theory of 
mind, which depicts an innate, automatic cognitive module responsible for ToM that 
is activated at around 2 to 3 years of age. In their theory of mind mechanism model 
(ToMM), the first component is a neurocognitive mechanism that takes the behavior 
of social agents as input information to generate candidate representations that might 
have contributed to this behavior. After the candidates are generated, a second 
mechanism called the selection processor chooses the most plausible candidate 
through inhibition, taking into account whether the belief is true or false as well as 
whether the desire is to approach or to avoid. In the case of standard false-belief 
scenario in Wimmer and Pemer (1983), ToMM spontaneously identifies at least two 
possible contents, that is, the object is in the original location (false-belief content) 
and the object is in the new location (true belief content). These contents are then 
reviewed by the selection processor, with the true belief content being initially more 
salient than the false belief content. Yet as it is depicted that the agent has a false 
belief regarding the location of the target object, the true-belief content is inhibited 
and rejected such that the false-belief content would be selected as the final candidate. 
This two-component theory of mind model postulates that theory of mind is based on 
domain-specific cognitive mechanism, and the gradual maturation of this ToMM is 
what underlies the observed developmental pathway in theory of mind. . 
Empirical research has lent support to this view of domain-specificity 
underlying theory of mind. Using a scenario study, Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall 
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(1998) showed that individual differences in mind-reading ability could not be 
attributed to variances in working memory capacity, pointing to the conclusion that 
specific cognitive skills are required for understanding the mental states of a person, 
which are different from those required for recalling factual events. Evidence from 
studies on psychiatric disorders such as autism has also been in line with this model. 
Autistic children perform significantly more poorly on false belief tasks compared to 
other cognitive tasks testing intelligence and language capacities (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Frith, 1994), which possibly suggests that autism could be one of the consequences of 
a specific deficit of the domain-specific ToMM. Also, neuroimaging studies on adult 
participants also showed that specific brain regions are involved in theory of mind 
performance (Frith & Frith，1999; German et al, 2004; Saxe et al, 2004), supporting 
this modular view of theory of mind. In the functional MRI study conducted by 
German et al in 2004，increased activity was found in specific brain regions, including 
medial prefrontal areas, when participants viewed video clips of actors performing 
pretend actions as compared with real actions. This finding supported the automatic 
and domain-specific aspects of the ToMM model, as it showed that specific brain 
areas associated with making explicit mental statejudgments are also activated in 
response to actions that call for mental state interpretation, even when the participants 
have not been explicitly instructed to interpret the mental states of the actor. 
A study done by Wertz and German (2007) also argued for the automaticity of 
the ToMM mechanism. In their study, participants were required to read short stories 
similar to the change-in-location task, in which an actor places a target object in one 
location, leaves the room, and then another character moves the target object to a 
second location. To retrieve the target object, the first actor approaches the initial 
location on her retum, where a distracter object is either present or absent depending 
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on the experimental condition. It was found that when the story characters were 
described as searching in the wrong place for a target object, resulting in their 
approach to the distracter object, adult subjects were more likely to explain the 
character's action as desiring the distracter object. Through this study, the authors 
proposed that when people are presented with information about the actions of a 
social agent, cognitive mechanism automatically generates candidate belief-desire 
explanations for that action. In the cases where the action of an agent is directed 
towards a particular object, mental states related to that object, including a desire for it 
and a true belief about it, are represented and influence decisions about what likely 
caused the observed action. In other words, when we see others approaching an object, 
we would have a tendency to reason that they approach that object because they want 
the object and they know the object is there, even if the original scenario depicts that 
the character approaches that location because s/he has a false belief about another 
target object. 
While ToMM depicts theory of mind as an innate, hard-wired cognitive 
module, the theory-theory proposed by Bartsch & Wellman (1995) treats mental states 
as theoretical entities, with the rules connecting these entities being acquired, leamed 
and then used to make inferences when children grow up, giving rise to theory-of-
mind. According to this theory, children make sense of other minds by learning and 
applying a general theory of the way minds work. Such understanding of mind 
develops through a succession of three, progressively more accurate theories, namely 
desire theory, desire-belief theory, and adult-like belief-desire theory. For very young 
children (those smaller than 2 years old), their theory of mind follows the desire . 
theory, meaning that the children understand desires only and lack any understanding 
of belief. As they grow up, their desire-belief theory is developed and they begin to 
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understand belief. Yet, they only have a peripheral understanding of belief, which is 
easily overshadowed by desire. It is not until after 4 years old that an adult-like belief-
desire theory is developed, which includes full integration of desire and belief for the 
successful performance of false belief tasks. This theory depicts theory of mind as an 
acquired capability that relies on a theory-mediated inference. In order to detect other 
people's mental states, the theory-mediated inference can draw on perceptually 
available information about the action taken by the target, other information in the 
environment as well as memory about the target's past behavior to infer the mental 
state. Whether or not such theory is stored in a specific site is still a matter of debate. 
Some authors (e.g. Fodor, 1992) view it as a special type of knowledge which is 
stored in a specific mental module, while others (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1994) 
conceive it as just another kind of knowledge that is parallel to various types of world 
knowledge. 
Adult theory of mind 
Although general consensus from developmental research stipulates that 
theory of mind is maturely developed at around age 6 (Kesar, Lin, & Barr，2003), 
such that adults are able to distinguish between external reality and belief held by 
others, people's childhood egocentrism has not been completely removed. Many 
social judgments have been found to be egocentrically based, and people tend to 
overestimate the extent to which others share the perception of the world as they do. 
For instance, people tend to believe that their mental states are more transparent to 
others than they actually are (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec，1998) and exaggerate the 
extent to which others will share their thoughts and feelings (Keysar, 1994; Van 
Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein’ 2000). Despite so, in the current literature on theory 
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of mind, there have been few studies investigating how adults deploy their theory of 
mind capacity. 
Keysar, Lin and Barr (2003) argued that while adults have the ability to 
interpret social actions by means of a theory of mind, they do not deploy such ability 
reliably in interpreting others' behavior. In their study, participants played a 
referential communication game in pairs. One of the participants hid a roll of tape in 
an opaque paper bag, with the awareness that the other participant (the director) did 
not know what was in the paper bag. Yet, when the director asked the participant to 
"move the tape", referring to a cassette tape box which was mutually visible to both 
participants, 71% of participants attempted to move the paper bag in at least one out 
of four trails, and 46% attempted to move it for at least half of the trials, indicating 
that they did not take into account the information that the director was ignorant of the 
identity of the object in the bag. Their study provided evidence to the argument that 
though adults have a sophisticated theory of mind, it is not automatically deployed in 
understanding other's action and intention. Other contextual factors are at work. 
Another study by Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino and Samson (2006) 
also points to the argument that adult's belief-reasoning is not automatic. The authors 
used an incidental false-belief task to examine whether people make automatic 
inference of other people's mental states. In their study, participants were shown video 
stimuli depicting actor placing and switching the location of an object, with an aim of 
indicating the location of the object at the end of each trial. At first, an actor hid an 
object in one of two boxes. Another actor then looked in the boxes and marked the 
location of the object on one of the boxes. In the experimental condition, after the ‘ 
second actor left the room, the first actor switched the boxes, resulting in a false belief 
in the second actor's part. Unexpected probe sentences tapping belief ("She thinks 
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that it's in the box on the right") or reality ("It's true that it's in the box on the right") 
were then presented for the participants to judge their correctness. The rationale is that 
as subjects needed to process information regarding the object's location in order to 
point out its location at the end of each trial, reality probe could be answered with 
information that had already been processed. On the other hand, if belief reasoning is 
automatic, information related to the second actor's belief would be updated 
automatically when the location of the boxes has been switched, so that reaction time 
to belief probes would be the same as that of reality probes as both are answered with 
information that has already been processed. It was shown that subjects responded 
more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an 
object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. This 
difference in reaction time was not due to inherently different response time 
associated with belief and reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in 
response time to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the 
person's beliefs about the object's location. 
All these investigations into adult's theory of mind suggest that adults do not 
reliably and automatically exhibit the mature theory of mind that is ascribed to them. 
Rather, the mature theory of mind capability in adults is deployed in a strategic way, 
such that we infer others' mental state only when it is called for in some specific 
situations. Lndeed, such pattem of theory of mind deployment is similar to what 
developmental researchers identified from young children's understanding of mental 
states, where young children's performance on false belief tasks was significantly 
improved in specific contexts such as pretense and trickery. The above evidence thus 
contradicts the ToMM hypothesis, which argues that theory of mind is based on 
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domain-specific cognitive mechanisms that are fast, informationally encapsulated, and 
automatic (Apperly et al., 2006). 
Study 1 
In view of the mixed evidence regarding the automaticity of theory of mind, 
our study aims to further investigate the question of whether adults do automatically 
take into account other's mental states in understanding behavior. Indeed, although 
automatic cognitive processes have been proposed as the backbone of the theory of 
mind mechanism, little direct evidence for it has been reported. The present research 
extends Wertz and German's (2007) study in further investigating the automaticity 
argument, and because of this, a pilot study with an aim of replicating Wertz and 
German's (2007) study and finding out if any improvement in the procedure was 
needed had been conducted. Similar to the original study conducted by Wertz and 
German (2007)，the hypothesis of this pilot study is that people would be more likely 
to incorrectly endorse a desire explanation for a distracter object in a false belief 
context, when the search for the target object led to the approach to that distracter 
object. 
Participants 
Five Cantonese-speaking undergraduate students from the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong participated in this pilot study for course credit. 
Design and materials ， 
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The experimental stimuli used in Wertz and German's (2007) study was 
adopted. Short stories depicting a change in location scenario were shown to the 
participants on a computer screen, such as the following: 
"Mary puts her hairdryer next to her perfume in the drawer and leaves the 
room. While Mary is in the shower, Gina moves the hairdryer to the cabinet. Mary 
comes back into the room for her hairdryer. She goes directly to the drawer." 
In this story, the focal character, Mary, has a false belief about the target 
object (hairdryer). Because of this false belief, she approaches a location with a 
distracter object in an attempt to retrieve the target object (approach towards distracter, 
ADO). The other experimental condition involves stories depicting that the focal 
character approaches an empty location (approach towards empty location, AE): 
"Mary puts her hairdryer in the drawer and leaves the room. While Mary is in 
the shower, Gina moves the hairdryer next to her perfume in the cabinet. Mary comes 
back into the room for her hairdryer. She goes directly to the drawer." 
A question asking why the story character goes to a particular place ("Why 
does Mary go there?") was then presented after each story, followed by a sentence 
that either describes the belief (true or false) or desire (towards target or 
towards distracter) held by the story character, as shown in the following table: 
• ^»-
Explanation type Example explanation Correctness 
一 
Desire for target Because she wanted to get her hairdryer from the drawer Correct explanation. 
^ 
Desire for distracter Because she wanted to get her perfume from the drawer Incorrect explanation 
</ 
False belief about target Because she thought her hairdryer was in the drawer Correct explanation. 
y 
True belief about target Because she thought her hairdryer was in the cabinet Incorrect explanation 
I I > 
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Participants' task was to judge whether the sentence shown could correctly 
answer the question, and response was given by pressing one of the two response keys. 
The stories, which had been translated to Chinese, were presented on the 
computer screen through E-prime, an experiment operating software. Each of the 
participants read and responded to 27 ADO stories and 27 AE stories presented in 
random order. Accuracy data as well as reaction time data were collected. We had 
also collected participants' qualitative feedback on the experimental procedure, 
especially probing whether they used any short-cut strategies in completing the 
experimental task, for possible improvement in the experimental procedure. 
Results 
With the small sample size of 5 participants in this pilot study, quantitative 
analysis did not yield any significant results. However, it was noted that participants 
completed the study within a very short period of time, on average taking less than 15 
minutes in finishing the 54 trials. Qualitative inputs from the participants suggested 
that they used mental strategies to perform the task required in the experiment, the 
most common one being viewing and memorizing only the location and the object 
concerned without reading the whole story after the first few trials. In view of that, 
filler trials were included in study 3 to prevent participants from using mental 
strategies to complete the experimental task. The filler trials consist of stories similar 
to the experimental trials. But instead of probing the reason for the story character to 
approach a particular location ("Why does Mary go there?"), the filler trials probe for 
the location where the object desired by the story character was placed ("Where is the 
object wanted by Mary at last?"). To answer this filler trial correctly, participants need , 
to read and understand the whole story, and the mental strategy reported by the 
participants in the pilot study would not work for both ADO and AE condition. Thus 
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it serves to prevent participants from memorizing only the key objects / locations and 
skipping the story. 
Study 2 
Although Wertz and German (2007) interpreted the result of their study as 
supporting the automaticity argument, an alternative explanation arguing otherwise 
exists. The error of attributing desire to the protagonist when s/he approaches the 
distracter in a false belief context could be a result of the strategic (non-automatic) 
nature of theory of mind, such that information about the protagonist's belief was not 
automatically taken into account when participants reasoned about the protagonist's 
desire. In the second study, I seek to critically test these two alternative explanations 
by presenting the participants with both false belief and true belief stories. In false 
belief stories, story character has a false belief about the target object, thinking that it 
is hidden in one location yet it has actually been moved to another location. When the 
story character searches for the target object in the original location, s/he then 
approaches a distracter object (in ADO story type) or an empty location (in AE story 
type). In such false belief stories, desire would not be helpful in interpreting the 
protagonist's action towards the distracter, as the search was purely directed by a false 
belief held about the target object, instead of a desire for the distracter object, bi other 
words, the story character's action in false belief stories is driven by 1) a desire for the 
target, and 2) a false belief about the target, but not a desire for the distracter object. 
Contrarily for true belief stories, the story character is depicted as having a true belief 
about two objects placed in two separate locations. With a true belief about the 
location of both objects, desire for the object stored in a particular location would be 
the only plausible explanation for the story character's action towards that location. 
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Two different combinations of true belief and false belief stories, one 
dominated by true belief stories (in 'true belief stories dominant' condition) and the 
other by false belief stories (in 'false belief stories dominant' condition), were 
presented to two separate groups of participants. If theory of mind reasoning is 
automatically deployed, the performance of participants should be the same 
irrespective of the proportion that the two types of story are presented: 
Hypothesis 1: Accuracy rate in rejecting the desirefor distracter explanation 
in ADO stories does not show significant difference between 'true beliefstories 
dominant' group and ‘false beliefstories dominant' group. 
However, if theory of mind deployment is strategic in nature, participants shall 
be sensitive to the proportion of true belief to false belief stories, as these two types of 
story call for vastly different mental states in interpretation. Participants would then 
be inclined to use desire as explanation when the majority of stories presented are true 
belief stories, while belief would be more frequently used as explanation when the 
majority is false belief stories. 
Hypothesis 2: Accuracy rate in rejecting the desirefor distracter explanation 
/n ADO stories would be lowerfor ‘true beliefstories dominant，group than ‘false 
beliefstories dominant' group. 
Participants 
Forty-one undergraduate students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
participated in this study for either course credit or small monetary reward. They were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, namely 'true belief stories , 
dominant' (N=18) and 'false belief stories dominant' (N=23). The proportion of males 
to females in each condition was approximately equivalent. 
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Design and materials 
In order to test whether the attribution error observed in Wertz and German's 
(2007) study was due to the automaticity of theory of mind, apart from the false belief 
stories in Wertz and German's original study, true belief stories which require desire 
instead of belief as the underlying explanation for the protagonist's action were 
presented to the participants as well: 
"Mary puts her hairdryer next to her perfume in the drawer. While Mary is in 
the room, she watches Gina move the hairdryer to the cabinet. Mary wants to get 
something. She goes directly to the drawer," 
"Mary puts her hairdryer next to her perfume in the drawer. While Mary is in 
the room, she watches Gina move the hairdryer to the cabinet. Mary wants to get 
something. She goes directly to the cabinet." 
In these two stories, Mary has a true belief about both the location of hairdryer 
and perfume. The correct explanation for why Mary goes to the drawer is that she 
wants the hairdryer, while that for the action of going to the cabinet is that she wants 
the perfume. In other words, true belief stories call for a desire explanation for 
protagonists' behaviour. 
A question asking why the story character goes to a particular place ("Why 
does Mary go there?") was presented after each story, followed by a sentence that 
either describes the belief (tme or false) or desire (towards approached-object or 
towards not-approached-object) held by the story character, as shown in the following 
table for the first true belief story quoted above: 
Explanation type Example explanation Correctness 
"_'•' " ‘ I •••• • ^ 
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Desire for approached- Because she wanted to get her perfume from the drawer Correct explanation, 
_ o b j ^ 
E>esire for not- Because she wanted to get her hairdryer from the drawer Incorrect explanation 
_approached-object 
False belief not- Because she thought her hairdryer was in the drawer Incorrect explanation, 
__approached-obj ect 
True belief about Because she thought her hairdryer was in the cabinet Correct explanation 
_approached-Qbject 
The stories in Chinese were presented on the computer screen through E-prime, 
an experiment operating software. Participants were instructed to read and understand 
the stories, after which a question asking why the story character goes to a particular 
place was presented. Following the question, sentence that either describes the belief 
(true or false) or desire (towards targetMpproached-object or towards the 
distracter/not-approached-object) was presented, and the participants' task was to 
judge whether the sentences presented could adequately and correctly answer the 
preceding question. Accuracy as well as reaction time data of the responses were 
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collected. 
There were 2 experimental conditions in this study with varying proportion of 
tme belief versus false belief stories. As the response in the false belief trials is the 
focus of our analysis, its number across the two conditions was made constant. In both 
experimental conditions, participants were exposed to 32 false belief story trials. 
However, one group of participants (those in 'true belief stories dominant' condition) 
were presented with 68 true belief stories mixed with the false belief stories, while the 
other group (those in 'false belief stories dominant' condition) were presented with 
only 8 true belief stories mixed with the false belief ones. The sequence of 
presentation of the experimental trials was randomized. If the proclivity for attributing ‘ 
desire in ADO story type is due to the automaticity of theory of mind, the accuracy 
rate in explaining the action of the story character for the two groups should be similar. 
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Yet, if such proclivity is the result of a strategic theory of mind that fail to take into 
account certain mental-state information in interpreting action, the accuracy rate 
should be lower for the mental state explanation that is called for in the less 
frequently-occurring type of story. 
The experiment lasted around 45 minutes for the 'false belief stories 
dominant' group and around 1 hour for the 'true belief stories dominant' group. 
In analyzing the results, trials with story reading time shorter than 6 seconds 
were discarded. The data for 1 participant in 'true belief stories dominant' condition 
and that for 3 participants in 'false belief stories dominant' condition were discarded 
as their story reading time was shorter than 6 seconds in majority of the trials. 
Results 
Participants' accuracy rates for each explanation type in each story type, 
arranged by condition, were consolidated in Table 1. A 2 (condition; 'true belief 
stories dominant', 'false belief stories dominant') by 2 (story type; ADO, AE) by 4 
(explanation type; ‘desire for target', ‘desire for distracter', 'false belief about target，， 
'true belief about target') analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures for 
the ‘story type' and 'explanation type' factor was run to analyze the data. There was a 
main effect of explanation type (7¾, 33) = 11.278; p < 0.01) and a main effect of story 
type (F(i, 35) = 5.946, p < 0.01)，qualified by a condition by story type interaction 
(F(3,35) = 4.807，p<0.01). There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction 
between condition, story type and explanation type (F(3,33)=2.7Ol,p = 0.061), as well 
as a marginally significant two-way interaction between story type and condition 
(^33)=2.830, p = 0.053), indicating that participants' accuracy rate shows different 
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patterns under different combinations of explanation types and story types across the 
two conditions. 
Table 1. Means and SD in all conditions for study 2 
— DT DD FB TB 
— Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
True belief stories dominant 
ADO 100% 0 66.18%a 0.2643 93.63%^ 0.1198 78.92% 0.3106 
AE 98.53% 0.0606 84.80%' 0.1593 100.00%^ 0.0000 86.76% 0.2186 
False belief stories dominant 
ADO 89.17% 0.2420 81.25% 0.3128 93.75% 0.2276 89.58% 0.175 
^ 93.75% 0.2276 83.33% 0.2621 95.00% 0.2236 83.33% 0.2493 
Note. Different superscripts for pairs that are different significantly at p<.05 
To better understand how participants' accuracy rate differs across the two 
conditions, a 2 (condition; 'true belief stories dominant', 'false belief stories 
dominant') by 4 (explanation type; ‘desire for target’，‘desire for distracter', 'false 
belief about target’，'true belief about target，) ANOVA was run for each condition 
separately. For the true belief stories dominant condition, significant main effect for 
explanation type (F(3,14) = 14.25; p < 0.01) and story type (F(i,i6)=9.33, p < 0.01) 
were found, which was qualified by an interaction effect between story type and 
explanation type (F(3,14) = 3.63, p < 0.05). Paired-sample t-test showed that there was 
significant difference in accuracy rate for ‘desire for distracter' probe in ADO story 
and AE story (f(i6)=2.681,p< 0.05), with accuracy rate in ADO story (M = 66.18%) 
lower than that in AE story (M = 84.8%). It was also found that the accuracy rate for 
false belief explanation type was significantly lower in ADO story (M = 93.63%) than , 
AE story (M = 100%), t _ = 2.193, p < 0.05. 
On the other hand, for the 'false belief dominant' condition, there was neither 
significant main effect nor interaction effect between explanation type and story type, 
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indicating that participants' accuracy rate across different stories and explanation 
types was similar. 
Discussion 
Participants presented with majority of true belief stories mixed with false 
belief stories showed greater error in mental state attribution, as they were more 
inclined to endorse desire explanations for the distracter object when the search 
resulted in an approach towards that distracter in a false-belief situation. However, for 
participants presented with majority of false belief stories, such error was not detected. 
This pattem is in line with the strategic hypothesis. Li true belief stories where story 
character knows the location of the two objects correctly, desire would be the mental 
state accountable for the character's action. As the participant was exposed to true 
belief stories in most of the trials, they were accustomed to attribute story character's 
action as a cause of their desire. Thus, when false belief stories popped up, such 
strategic tendency led to the incorrect attribution of story character's action towards 
the distracter object as a desire towards that distracter object, instead of attributing it 
to the false beliefheld about the target object. This indicated the strategic nature of 
mental states attribution, which could be affected by the predominant mental state that 




Although study 2 suggests that people's inference of belief or desire when we 
interpret other's action is strategic in nature, an important piece of information 
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associated with such interpretation is missing. The association between people's 
action and their mental state differs under different contexts because of situational 
demand. For example, if we saw that Mary read books at her leisure time, we tend to 
reason it in terms of her desire in reading - that Mary wanted to read books. Yet, if we 
saw that Mary read books at her mother's presence, then using desire in explaining 
her behavior may not be the most optimal due to situational demand. Mary might have 
done the action to please her mother. Thus, in different situations, the relevance of 
mental states in driving one's behavior differs. In this study we aim at investigating 
the effect of contextual cues in the deployment of theory of mind in interpreting 
action. 
Given that mental states inference is dependent on situational cues, certain 
mechanisms, either incorporated within the theory of mind mechanism or separated 
from it, shall take into account such cues when we reason or make inferences about 
other's action. In low-demand situations, people's mental state is the main driving 
force of their action, and such situational cues shall increase people's alertness 
towards mental states. On the contrary, mental states are less relevant in explaining 
people's behavior in high-demand situations, rendering them less salient in such 
situations. Past researches have shown that salience of mental states was a factor 
affecting children's performance in false belieftasks (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala，1989) 
and such saliency could be brought about by various situational manipulations. The 
most direct way would be highlighting the initial mental state of the protagonist in the 
experiment materials, such as mentioning the protagonist's desire or belief in the story. 
Thus, our first hypothesis is that if information about the story character's desire (in ‘ 
‘desire cue，condition) or motivation was provided, deployment of theory of mind 
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reasoning would be enhanced, and thus the error made in wrongly endorsing the 
desire for distracter explanation in ADO stories would be reduced. 
Hypothesis 3: Accuracy rate in rejecting the desirefor distracter explanation 
in ADO stories would be higher when the protagonist's initial desirefor the target is 
mentioned, compared with control condition 
Another way to manipulate the saliency of mental state would be by framing 
the task in terms of trickery. There has been abundant evidence supporting that 
mentioning deception enhances children's performance in false belief tasks. Several 
studies gathered evidence that framing the task in terms of explicit deceit reduces 
young children's egocentric error (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala，1989)，and the meta-
analysis conducted by Wellman, Cross and Watson (2001) further supported that 
when a deceptive motive was explicitly stated, the performance in the false belief task 
was enhanced for children of all age. It was argued that framing the story in terms of 
trickery enhances children's performance through making mental state more salient in 
comparison with the alternative real state of affairs. Thus, our second hypothesis is 
that when information about deception is provided (in 'deception cue，condition), 
deployment of theory of mind reasoning would be enhanced, and thus the error made 
in wrongly endorsing the desire for distracter explanation in ADO stories would be 
reduced. 
Hypothesis 4: Accuracy rate in rejecting the desirefor distracter explanation 
in ADO stories would be higher when the story isframed in terms oftrickery, 
compared with control condition 
Participants 
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Sixty-two undergraduate students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
participated in this study for either course credit or a small monetary reward. They 
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The proportion of 
males to females in each condition was approximately equivalent. 
Design and materials 
In studying how contextual cues affect adults' inference of mental states from 
other people's action, the methodology used in Wertz and German's (2007) study was 
adopted. Short stories depicting a change in location scenario, resulting in either 
approach to distracter or approach to empty location, were shown to the participants 
on a computer screen. 
To study how contextual cues affect belief-desire reasoning, the stories were 
slightly modified to incorporate cues such as deception and original desire held by the 
character. To highlight the original desire held by the character, Mary, to the target 
object, the following sentence was added in the beginning of the original story: 
"Mary loves her hairdryer" 
To highlight the point that Mary went to the wrong location because she was 
deceived, the following sentence was used in the new story: 
"Gina, in an attempt to fool Mary, moves the hairdryer next to her perfume in 
the cabinet" 
The stories in Chinese were presented on the computer screen through E-prime, 
an experiment operating software. Participants were instructed to read and understand 




"Mary loves her hairdryer. Mary puts her hairdryer next to her perfume in the 
drawer and leaves the room. While Mary is in the shower, Gina moves the hairdryer 
to the cabinet. Mary comes back into the room for her hairdryer. She goes directly to 
the drawer." 
After the story was presented, a question asking why the story character goes 
to a particular place was then presented: 
"Why does Mary go there?" 
Following the questions, a sentence was presented, which was selected . 
randomly from the four types of candidate explanations as presented in the table 
below: 
Explanation type Example explanation Correctness 
Desire for target Because she wanted to get her hairdryer from the drawer Correct explanation. 
_^ _^^ _^^ ___^ _^ «^_«_«.^ _^ ™_._.__^ _^^ _^ _^^ _^ —^—^—.—^—^—— ) 
Desire for distracter Because she wanted to get her perfume from the drawer Incorrect explanation 
False belief about target Because she thought her hairdryer was in the drawer Correct explanation. 
*" ^ 
True belief about target~ Because she thought her hairdryer was in the cabinet Incorrect explanation 
The participants' task was to judge whether the sentence presented could 
adequately and correctly answer the preceding question. Response was given by 
pressing one of the two response keys. Reaction time as well as accuracy of the 
responses were collected. 
To prevent participants from using strategies to memorize the answers and 
skip the stories, filler questions asking the true location of the desired object (i.e. 
target) were presented intermittently at unpredictable intervals. In total, 90 stories, 
consisting of 54 test stories and 36 filler stories were presented to the participants. 
Given the large number of trials, the stories were divided into three blocks, with a 10 
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second resting time in between. The experiment lasted around an hour on average. 
Trials with story reading time shorter than 6 seconds were discarded. 
Results 
Participants' accuracy rates for each explanation type in each story type, 
arranged by condition, were consolidated in Table 2. A 3 (condition; control, 
deception cue, desire cue) by 2 (story type; ADO, AE) by 4 (explanation type; 'desire 
for target，，'desire for distracter', 'false belief about target', 'true belief about target’） 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures for the ‘story type' and 
'explanation type' factor was run to analyze the results. There was a main effect of 
explanation type (7¾ 57) = 14.482; p < 0.01), indicating that participant's accuracy rate 
differs for different explanation types. Other main effects and interaction effects were 
nonsignificant. 
Table 2. Means and SD in all conditions for study 2 
— DT DD FB TB 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Control 
ADO 97.17% 0.0695 76.42%^ 0.1828 94.98% 0.0751 94.61% 0.0894 
AE 99.17% 0.0373 91.50%^ 0.1130 96.33% 0.0613 92.89% 0.0876 
Deception cue 
ADO 94.00% 0.1137 80.17% 17.45% 93,93% 0.0689 94.91% 0.0647 
AE 96.50% 0.7210 79.75% 0.1953 91.51% 0.0992 96.61% 0.0491 
Desire cue 
ADO 90.61% 0.1702 82.05% 0.2550 88.29% 0.1371 93.28% 0.1454 
^ 94.55% 0.1503 81.89% 0.2414 88.22% 0.1817 92.12% 0.1758 
Note. Different superscripts for pairs that are different significantly at p<.05 
» 
Given that our major focus in this study is on the accuracy rate of participant's 
desire attribution, a 3 (condition; control, deception cue, desire cue) by 2 (explanation 
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type; ‘desire for target', ‘desire for distracter') by 2 (story type; ADO, AE) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures for ‘story type' and 'explanation type' 
factor, was run for further analysis. Similar to the previous analysis involving both 
desire and belief explanation, explanation type main effect was noted CF(i,59) = 40.209, 
p < 0.01). Apart from that, there was a story type main effect (F(i,59) = 4.663, p < 0.05), 
indicating that participants' accuracy rate differs for the two story types (ADO and 
AE). Three-way interaction between explanation type, story type and condition was 
marginally significant (F(2,59) = 3.054，p = 0.055), indicating that across the three 
conditions, participants showed different patterns in terms of their accuracy rate in 
different story types for different explanations. 
Separate 2 (explanation type; ‘desire for target', ‘desire for distracter') by 2 
(story type; ADO, AE) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures for 
‘story type' and 'explanation type' factor was run for each of the three conditions to 
analyze the results further. For the control condition, significant main effects for 
explanation type (F(i.i9)=27.945,p< 0.01) and story type (F(1,19)= 12.501,p< 0.01) 
were found, which was qualified by an interaction effect between explanation type 
and story type (/^ (1,19)= 11.811,p< 0.01). As revealed in paired-sample t-test, 
accuracy rate was significantly lower for ‘desire for distracter' explanation type in 
ADO story (M = 76.42%), as compared with AE story (M = 91.50%) (r(19)= 3.823, p 
< 0.01). There was no such pattem for the ‘desire for target' explanation type. For 
deception cue condition and desire cue condition, although main effect for story type 
was found (F(i,i9)=26.379, p < 0.01 for deception cue condition and F(i,2i)= 5.139, p 
< 0.05 for desire cue condition), there was no interaction effect between story type 
and explanation type (F(i,i9)=0.387, p = 0.541 for deception cue condition; F(i,2i) = 
0.345，p=0.563 for desire cue condition). The results indicated a greater difference in 
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accuracy rate in rejecting the ‘desire towards distracter' explanation in the ADO story 
relative to the AE story in the control condition, as compared with deception cue and 
desire cue conditions. 
Discussion 
This study shows that contextual cues do affect people's performance in 
mental state attribution task. When the stories incorporated cues which are related to 
mental states (such as deception and original desire held by the character), participants 
were less prone to err in attributing the mental states responsible for story character's 
action. Participants were more reliable in rejecting the desire explanations for 
distracter object when the search was directed towards that object (as in the ADO 
story) when contextual cues were present in the story, as compared with the control 
condition where the contextual cues were absent. This suggests that in situation where 
mental states are more salient, people's attribution of mental states in accounting for 
other's action tends to be more accurate. 
General discussion 
The mechanism underlying theory of mind has been characterized as a fast, 
informationally encapsulated, and automatic cognitive mechanism under the ToMM 
model (Apperly et al., 2006). Yet, such characterization has been challenged by 
studies that pointed to the argument that adults' belief-reasoning is not automatic, as 
shown by the limitations on effective deployment of theory of mind (Keysar, Shuhong, 
& Barr, 2003). The current experiments attempt to test the automaticity of theory of 
mind by varying the saliency of the two key mental states (belief versus desire) when ‘ 
participants were in the process of making belief-desire reasoning, either through 
varying the proportion of experimental stimuli that call for different mental states in 
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interpretation (study 2)，or through varying the content of the experimental stimuli and 
highlighting the mental states explicitly (study 3). Through this we also aimed to 
explore under what circumstances would the deployment of theory of mind be 
enhanced. 
When the mental state of desire was frequently called for in attributing other's 
action in the frequent appearance of tme belief stories, participants made more error 
in wrongly endorsing the desire explanation in attributing story character's action 
towards a distracter object, which was a result of having a false belief about another 
target object. According to Leslie and his colleagues (Friedman & Leslie，2004; Leslie 
2007; Thaiss, 1992), ToMM automatically parses behavior in terms of possible mental 
state descriptions, which were then reviewed by the selection processor, inhibiting the 
inappropriate mental states. Following this ToMM model, we would expect that 
participant's performance in the task would not be affected by the mix in tme belief 
versus false belief stories, as separate possible mental state descriptions would be 
generated and reviewed automatically in each separate trial. However, we found that 
participants were more inclined to endorse the desire explanation for the story 
character's action in approaching the distracter object when they were exposed to 
more true belief stories, which calls for the mental state of desire in appropriately 
explaining one's action. This finding is incompatible with the ToMM model and 
suggests that adults' belief-desire reasoning is strategic in nature, which would be 
affected by the predominant mental states that has been adapted at a particular time. 
Taking the view of a strategic nature of theory of mind, a question that follows 
is when, and what serves as a trigger for the strategic deployment of theory of mind. 
The most direct candidates would be situational cues that are related to people's 
mental states. The key question for my investigation is whether situational cues which 
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highlight the appropriate mental state for interpreting people's behavior would be 
picked up such that improvement in belief-desire reasoning would be shown. In study 
3，it was demonstrated that when contextual cues relating to mental states (stories 
depicting a trickery situation or highlighting character's initial desire towards the 
target object) were presented, people were less prone to endorse the explanation that 
the character approaches the distracter object due to a desire towards that distracter 
object. This suggests that situational cues that enhance the saliency of mental states 
(which is desire in our case) serve as a trigger for the active deployment of theory of 
mind in interpreting other's action, thus resulting in a more accurate attribution. This 
is in line with German et al's functional MRI study (2004) showing that specific brain 
regions associated with explicit mental states attribution are automatically activated 
when participants view videos depicting pretense. It is possible that such cues were 
picked up automatically, activating the theory of mind mechanism and thus enhancing 
our performance of the task later on. The current findings also echo with evidence 
from infants' early belief attribution, where framing the task in terms of explicit deceit 
reduces young children's egocentric error (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989). It appears 
that the role of such situational cues in assisting the effective deployment of theory of 
mind is as important for infant as for adults. 
In their original study conducted in 2007, Wertz and German argued that the 
automatic nature of theory of mind led participants to generate metal representation 
about the story character's desire when they approach the distracter object, thus 
resulting in the increased error rate in rejecting this ‘desire towards distracter' 
explanation. However, such error also highlighted that participants did not , 
automatically take into account story character's false belief in their belief-desire 
reasoning process. It pointed to dissociation between the mechanism underlying desire 
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attribution and belief attribution - while desire attribution is automatic, belief 
attribution is not. However, in this study, it was shown that even such desire 
attribution is not automatic, as it would be affected by the predominant mental state 
that the environment calls for, as well as the presence of cues that enhance saliency of 
mental states. It pointed to the possibility that when people are strategically engaged 
by the environment to employ their theory of mind capacity, they would perform 
better in inferring the belief and desire of others, thus making the right attribution. 
With the findings in this thesis addressing that situational cues do play a role 
in enhancing people's performance in correctly attributing others' action to their 
desire, further studies could be conducted to investigate whether this could be 
extended to belief-attribution, or other mental states attribution. Theory of mind is a 
very broad topic encompassing various mental states which are relevant in 
understanding others and interpreting their action. Past studies have shown that 
development of our capability in understanding these mental states, and its subsequent 
performance are not necessary the same (Nguyen & Frye, 1999; Wellman & Woolley， 
1990). In interpreting the results and making inference on the mechanism underlying 
theory-of-mind, we have to be cautious that the same mechanism may or may not 
apply to the understanding / reasoning of various mental states under theory-of-mind, 
and further studies would be needed to investigate whether different mechanism exists 
for different metal state reasoning. 
Moreover, it would be beneficial to further investigate the mechanism under 
which situational cues affect our belief-desire reasoning. In particular, whether these 
cues are components of a broader theory of mind mechanism, or theyjust serve to 
initiate the active deployment of the theory of mind for desire-attribution. This would 
shed light on our understanding on a more comprehensive theory of mind model. 
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In evaluating the studies reported in this thesis, it was noted that some of the 
major findings are only marginally significant under the statistical tests. With only 
around 20 participants per experimental condition due to resources constraint, the 
sample size is considered small, bi future research, a larger sample size would be 
more optimal to confirm the findings from the present studies. Also, given that the 
studies reported are centered around belief-desire reasoning, which is only one aspect 
of theory of mind, future studies could be extended to investigate factors affecting 
other adult theory of mind performance, such as 'hindsight bias，(Bemstein, Atance, 
Loftus, & Meltzoff’ 2004; Fishhoff, 1975), and limits on effective deployment of 
theory of mind (Keysar, Shuhong, & Barr’ 2003). Studies of different modalities, like 
actual interpersonal interaction in Keysar, Shuhong & Bar's 2003 study, instead ofthe 
current story reading and responding, could be conducted to extend the findings to a 
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